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I. INTRODUCTION
I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is
the lamp of experience. I know no way of judging the future
but by the past. 1
My interest is in the future because I am going to spend the
rest of my life there. 2
* J.D., Florida State University College of Law, May 2007. The author would like to
thank Rick Sites, Dr. Greg Mitchell, Shoshana Green, Tom Fitzpatrick IV, and the Florida
State University Law Review staff for suggestions on this Comment. The author would
also like to thank Benjamin Priester for his comments on a prior draft. The author welcomes discussion at BrianSites@comcast.net.
1. Unknown, FBI Futures Working Group, Futures Working Group Members: Quotables, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/td/fwg/quotables.htm (last visited July 2, 2007).
2. Charles
F.
Kettering,
quoted
at
The
Quotations
Page,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/11322.html (last visited July 2, 2007).
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In spite of thousands of years of science, humankind is distinctly
unable to predict the future. And yet, the judicial system is called
upon to do just so daily. In bail considerations, judges predict flight
risk. In parole hearings, officials contemplate the likelihood of reoffense. And in three states, a defendant convicted of a capital crime
will live or die based on what a judge and jury thinks he will do in an
unknown future. 3 It has been observed that “what separates the executioner from the murderer is the legal process by which the state
ascertains and condemns those guilty of heinous crimes. If that process is flawed . . . the legitimacy of our legal process is threatened.” 4
When states execute based in part on the defendant’s future actions,
the legal process is confronted with several complex questions. If
they cannot be satisfactorily answered, the state risks collapsing the
distinction between murderer and executioner.
This Comment collects and responds to several of the strongest
arguments—stemming from both constitutional objections and more
general concerns—against the use of future dangerousness as a consideration in death penalty sentencing. Following this Introduction,
Part II provides definitions and basic background information on future dangerousness. Part III compares the use of clinical methods to
actuarial methods for determining future dangerousness and advocates for the conclusion reached by other commentators that actuarial methods are preferable. It also briefly reviews the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide (VRAG) and the Classification of Violence Risk
(COVR) software, two actuarial tools referenced by example throughout this Comment. Part IV reviews the case law history of future
dangerousness and the death penalty. On the foundation laid by
Parts III and IV, Part V collects and responds to six of the most potent objections to future dangerousness: (1) relevance and admissibility of evidence, (2) the requirement of an individualized assessment,
(3) reliance on factors that do not index blameworthiness, (4) vagueness challenges, (5) predestination considerations, and (6) objections
to future dangerousness as nonretributive. Part VI considers generalized and specific arguments for the use of future dangerousness testimony. Part VII makes several specific suggestions as to how future
dangerousness evidence should be used by courts. Part VIII concludes with general comments.
II. SOME QUICK DEFINITIONS
“Future dangerousness” refers to the prediction of whether an individual in the criminal justice system will commit a violent crime in
3. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 37.071 § 2(e)(1)
(Vernon 2007); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2007).
4. Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 469-70 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring).
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the future. 5 Future dangerousness is ultimately a yes-or-no decision,
and juries are restricted to concluding that the defendant is or is not
a future danger; “maybe” is not an option. 6 However, the evidence
that informs this decision is rarely black and white: often it involves
conflicting expert opinions and competing risk assessments cast in
shades of grey. A “risk assessment” involves the use of clinical, actuarial, or physiological methods to determine the probability that an
individual will commit a violent crime in the future. Risk assessments return a percentage chance that a given defendant will commit a violent crime in the future. They are thus somewhat analogous
to when weather forecasts give a percentage chance that certain
weather will occur in the future. 7
Using risk assessments (or other future dangerousness evidence
presented), juries decide the larger, normative aspect of a future
dangerousness decision: how much risk is sufficient to conclude that
the defendant will be a future danger to society? In other words, if a
risk assessment expert testifies that there is a 52% chance that a defendant will commit a crime in the future, the jury must decide if
that chance is “enough” under the applicable law. It is presumed that
a jury can reach this conclusion without any explicit assistance, but
often expert witnesses are called on to give opinions or findings based
on different risk assessment methods. Thus, while a future dangerousness consideration is partially empirical, it is primarily normative
as juries are asked to determine whether the empirical component
compels the decision that the person is, in fact, a future danger.8
III. THE EMPIRICAL: CLINICAL AND ACTUARIAL METHODS
When mental health professionals testify as to whether a defendant is a future danger, several methods are available. These methods fall into two general categories: clinical methods that rely on the
subjective judgment of mental health professionals and actuarial
methods that rely on structured scoring tools and statistics. 9 Both
5. For a discussion of what should be defined as a “violent crime,” see Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 61, 72 (1999). For a comprehensive analysis of future dangerous predictions and
methodology, see generally VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING
AND MANAGING RISK (2d ed. 2006).
6. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 37.071
(Vernon 2007); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2007).
7. See John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Violent Storms and Violent People: How
Meteorology Can Inform Risk Communication in Mental Health Law, 51 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 931, 935-37 (1996).
8. For a discussion of the empirical and normative components of a future dangerous decision, see Aletha Claussen-Schulz et al., Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and
Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 471, 484-85 (2004).
9. Physiological methods also ostensibly exist, but research on them is thus far
scarce and therefore they are not considered in this Comment.
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clinical and actuarial models have been criticized, 10 but studies now
generally support the validity of at least some actuarial tools. 11 This
Part briefly reviews some of the findings on both clinical and actuarial methods and agrees, based on these findings and practical considerations, with the consensus of current literature that actuarial
methods are greatly preferable.
A. Clinical Methods
Clinical methods take several forms. A mental health professional
might interview a patient, examine his criminal record, talk with his
friends and family, or even, in extreme cases, base the future dangerousness prediction only on the fact pattern of the defendant’s
crime, as related to him at trial. 12 The mental health professional relies on any of a number of factors in making a clinical future dangerousness determination. The core feature of this method is that the
determination is based on the experience and intuition of the professional in an unstructured format; the clinician determines what is
important to consider in reaching his or her conclusion.
The greatest weakness of clinical methods is that they rely on the
subjective analysis of individual mental health professionals. Several
studies have shown that people make a variety of “systematic and
gross errors” 13 when asked to make predictions, and mental health
professionals are prone to the same mistakes. 14 Since the early
1980s, studies have shown that when mental health professionals
make predictions about future dangerousness based on clinical
methods, they are wrong much of the time. 15 Clinical assessment is
also problematic because it does not lend itself easily to any review or
10. See, e.g., Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409 (2001) (arguing evidence does not support the
conclusion that actuarial methods are superior to clinical methods); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 406-07 (2006).
11. See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 141-69.
12. Dr. James Grigson, discussed infra Part V.B, is the most infamous example of a
mental health professional utilizing this practice.
13. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 61. For a discussion of several of these errors,
see id. at 61-62.
14. See Lewis R. Goldberg, Simple Models or Simple Processes?: Some Research on
Clinical Judgments, 23 AM. PSYCHOLGIST 483, 484-85 (1968).
15. Compare Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others,
269 JAMA 1007 (1993) (setting forth a study which showed that 53% of patients predicted
to be violent later committed a violent act during the six-month follow-up period, while
36% of patients predicted to be safe later committed a violent act), with Diana Sepejak et
al., Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness: Two Year Follow-Up of 408 Pre-Trial Forensic
Cases, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 171 (1983) (setting forth a study which
showed that 39% of defendants rated to have a “medium” or “high” likelihood of future violence committed a violent act during the two-year follow-up period, while 26% rated to
have a “low” likelihood of future violence committed a violent act in the follow-up period).
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validation process. Because each clinician is relying on her own subjective method of clinical analysis, it is difficult to determine her accuracy—there are not likely to be articles on Dr. Jane’s particular
subjective method. The individual clinician is also unlikely to know
how accurate she is, especially in criminal predictions of future dangerousness. Unless she keeps track of the defendant’s subsequent
criminal history or lack thereof, she will receive no feedback on her
prediction.
These problems lead to a substantial variance in the quality of
clinical predictions. The situation is compounded by the fact that, because individual professionals are often unaware of even their own
capabilities, courts may be unable to identify qualified professionals.
Even assuming there are highly skilled clinical predictors—and studies suggest there are few—the court’s inability to identify them results in a game of expert witness Russian roulette: if a poor clinician
is in the chambers, the result for the defendant is likely death.
Finally, even assuming there exist highly skilled clinical predictors and it is a skilled predictor who testifies, the jury has no evaluative tools to determine if the expert is, in fact, correct. If, for example,
there is conflicting expert testimony and the highly skilled predictor
is inarticulate, her opinion may be disregarded in favor of a less capable, but charismatic opposing expert. The jury has no way to confront the methods objectively. Thus, based on practical difficulties,
clinical assessments are suboptimal measuring tools.
B. Actuarial Methods
Actuarial methods involve structured assessments in which the
mental health professional follows some set of instructions to determine the defendant’s risk of being a future danger. One such tool is
the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), developed in 1993 and
verified repeatedly since then. 16 Researchers created the VRAG
based on assessments of over 600 men at the maximum-security Oak
Ridge psychiatric hospital in Ontario, Canada. 17 Its creators began
with fifty variables obtained from institutional files and used statistical analysis to narrow the list down to the twelve most predictive
variables—those currently included in the VRAG. 18 The twelve
VRAG factors are: whether the defendant lived with both biological
16. See Grant T. Harris et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders:
The Development of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 315
(1993). However, the VRAG was not referred to as such until 1995. See also
http://www.mhcp-research.com/ragpage.htm for additional information on the VRAG’s history and http://www.mhcp-research.com/ragreps.htm for information on known replications of the VRAG.
17. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 144; Monahan, supra note 10, at 409-10.
18. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 141-47.
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parents until age sixteen, elementary school maladjustment, history
of alcohol problems, marital status, nonviolent criminal history, failure on a prior conditional release (such as bail, probation, parole, et
cetera), age, seriousness of victim injury for the index offense,
whether there was a female victim, the presence of a personality disorder, the presence of schizophrenia, and a Psychopathy Checklist
score. 19 The presence or absence of each variable corresponds with a
point value (+1, -2, +5, et cetera), and the total of these point values
places the defendant into one of nine risk categories, each with a corresponding probability of violent recidivism. 20 These probabilities, at
seven and ten years in the future, are produced in the table below. 21
VRAG
Category
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Percentage
Scoring in
Range
2
11
17
17
19
15
12
6
1

VRAG Score

7 years

10 years

≤ -22
-21 to -15
-14 to -8
-7 to -1
0 to + 6
+ 7 to + 13
+14 to +20
+21 to +27
≥ +28

0
0.08
0.12
0.17
0.35
0.44
0.55
0.76
1.00

0.08
0.10
0.24
0.31
0.48
0.58
0.64
0.82
1.00

Actuarial methods have recently come into increasing favor
among mental health professionals 22 and have been shown to be
more accurate and reliable than clinical measures. 23 New tools are
constantly in development; one of the newer actuarial methods, developed in the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, is the
Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) software. 24 This software,
19. See id. at 237-38.
20. See id. at 147-48, 237-40.
21. Table adapted from id., app. A at 240 and app. C at 245.
22. Id.
23. William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The
Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 298 (1996) (describing
how only 8 of 136 studies comparing clinical to actuarial methods found clinical methods to
be more accurate).
24. See John Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model of Violence Risk Assessment for Persons with Mental Disorders, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 810 (2005) [hereinafter Monahan
et al., An Actuarial Model], available at http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/
reprint/56/7/810; see also MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health & the Law,
The
MacArthur
Violence
Risk
Assessment:
Executive
Summary,
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validated and released in 2005, relies on a “classification tree” to consider several different combinations of risk factors and places participants into one of five risk classes. 25 The software was designed by
assessing over 1,000 patients in acute civil psychiatric facilities on
134 potential risk factors and then following the patients for twenty
weeks after discharge from the psychiatric hospital. 26 Most of the patients assessed fell into the lower risk categories instead of the
higher; 36.5% were in the lowest risk category while only 6.7% were
in the highest. 27 The resulting rate of violence for each class during
the twenty weeks after release was 1.2% for the lowest risk category,
7.7% for the next lowest, 26.2% for the middle category, 55.9% for the
second highest category, and 76.2% for the highest category. 28 Thus,
violence was highly concentrated in the highest risk classes.
Actuarial methods are not free from the concerns raised in Part
III.A, supra, regarding clinical methods, but the risk of errors going
undetected is much smaller. Just as experts are prone to making
mistakes in clinical predictions, it is also possible that professionals
administering actuarial methods will err, perhaps by inaccurate scoring or misunderstanding the results. But the adversarial system is
designed to address these possibilities through review by opposing
counsel’s experts and by cross-examination. Since actuarial tools are
transparent and standardized, these errors are easier to catch. Thus,
even if the court is confronted with an unskilled expert, it will have
several evaluative tools at its disposal to examine the interview findings, how the expert scored the test, what the literature says those
scores mean, and so on. If the court does not catch the errors itself,
the opposing counsel’s expert will have a chance to testify as to the
inaccuracies. If neither the court nor opposing counsel recognizes
that the expert has erred, the jury at least has at its disposal objective, scientific means and standards to determine the accuracy of the
expert’s methodology. 29

http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html (last visited July 2, 2007). For a summary of
the main findings of the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, see generally JOHN
MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL
DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001) [hereinafter MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK
ASSESSMENT].
25. Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model, supra note 24, at 810.
26. Monahan, supra note 10, at 411-12. For a list of the risk factors, see John
Monahan et al., Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for Assessing Violence Risk,
176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 312, 313-15 tbl. 1 (2000).
27. See MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 24, at 126.
28. See id. at 125 tbl. 6.7.
29. That is not to say that a jury’s task in evaluating such testimony is easy. However, actuarial tools offer the jury a chance to evaluate the expert’s findings, a chance that
clinical assessment generally do not provide.
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IV. THE NORMATIVE: THE HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND
FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
A. The Death Penalty
In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, 30 the Supreme Court held
that statutes which offered juries no guidance on what to consider in
death penalty sentencing were unconstitutional. 31 Because they led
to arbitrary and capricious impositions of the death penalty, such
statutes violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 32 In part
because five concurring opinions were filed in the case, 33 Furman
was widely received as confusing, and states responded to the ruling
in a variety of ways. 34 Some states specified in detail how the jury
was to consider the imposition of death 35 while others removed the
jury’s discretion entirely. 36 The variety of modifications and the diversity of statutes set the stage for reconsideration by the Supreme
Court.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 37 the Court upheld Georgia’s revised statute
because it allowed the jury to exercise discretion and provided statutory guidelines. 38 In particular, it specified consideration of statutory
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 39 Under Georgia’s statute, the death penalty was unlikely to be “wantonly and freakishly”
imposed. 40 But how would other states fare?
On the same day it decided Furman, the Court also decided
Woodson v. North Carolina. 41 Unlike Georgia, North Carolina had attempted to comply with Furman by removing jury discretion and
mandating the death penalty in first degree murder convictions. 42
The Woodson Court struck down the North Carolina statute because
it did not “replac[e] arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards.” 43 In other words, the Court wanted guided discretion, not no discretion at all. The Court also said that “[w]hile the
prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations gen30. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
31. See id. at 239-40; id. at 253, 255-58 (Douglas, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 239-40 (per curiam).
33. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
34. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of
Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
345, 352-53 (1998).
35. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163-66 (1976).
36. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976).
37. 428 U.S. 153.
38. Id. at 206-07.
39. Id. at 196-98.
40. Id. at 206-07.
41. 428 U.S. 280.
42. Id. at 286-87.
43. Id. at 303.
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erally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional
imperative . . . in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires [individualized sentencing].” 44 The Court emphasized that the severity and uniqueness
of the death penalty required an increased level of “reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case.” 45 Mandatory death sentences removed jury discretion and
failed this standard.
Yet another case decided with Furman and Woodson was Jurek v.
Texas, 46 a case that helped to ignite the current future dangerousness debate. The Texas statute at issue required the jury to consider
three special questions, the second of which involved future dangerousness. 47 Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had read
into the future dangerousness question the possibility for the defendant to bring to the jury’s attention any mitigating circumstances,
the Supreme Court held that the Texas statute was constitutional. 48
Although the discretion that Texas allowed juries to exercise was
narrow and formulaic, it was likely to lead to the consistent and predictable imposition of the death penalty. 49
B. Future Dangerousness
Seven years later, the Supreme Court decided Barefoot v.
Estelle. 50 If Jurek kindled the future dangerousness fire, Barefoot
poured on the kerosene by addressing the issue of expert witness testimony on future dangerousness. In Barefoot, the Court held that a
Texas district court had not erred in admitting psychiatric testimony
on future dangerousness. 51 During the sentencing phase, two State
experts testified that the defendant was likely to be dangerous in the
future. 52 One expert, psychiatrist Dr. James Grigson, even testified
that he was “100% sure” the defendant was going to repeat offend. 53
Neither expert had examined the defendant, and both expert opinions were based primarily on a lengthy hypothetical question posed
by the State in court. 54
Despite criticism from the American Psychiatric Association
44. Id. at 304.
45. Id. at 305.
46. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
47. See id. at 269.
48. Id. at 276. Texas’ statute now specifically provides an additional question on mitigating circumstances. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 37.071 § 2(e)(1) (Vernon 2007).
49. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
50. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
51. Id. at 905-06.
52. Id. at 884.
53. Id. at 905 n.11.
54. Id. at 917-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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(APA) in its amicus brief that psychiatrists were unable to accurately
predict future dangerousness, the majority held that psychiatrists
were accurate enough to pass constitutional muster. 55 The Court was
confident that the adversarial system would reveal inaccuracies in
testimony and that juries would be able to sort out the truth. 56 Over two
fierce dissents, the Court upheld the use of psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness because it was not “entirely unreliable”57 —despite
the APA’s contention that it was wrong “two times out of three.”58
Although Barefoot has been heavily criticized, 59 it has not been
overruled, and courts have continued to admit the testimony of mental health professionals. Some commentators have argued, however,
that the 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 60
modified the criteria for admitting expert testimony in criminal sentencing. 61 In Daubert, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
“echo[ed] the language of his dissent in Barefoot” 62 and overruled the
existing “general acceptance” test from Frye v. United States 63 for
admitting expert witness testimony. 64
Daubert, a federal civil case about birth defects caused by a morning sickness drug, identified a four-factor review for the admission of
expert testimony. 65 The review requires consideration of four “general observations,” a list of nonexclusive factors a judge is to consider
in determining whether to admit the testimony into evidence. 66
Unlike the narrow Frye test, Daubert’s four factors permit a more
comprehensive review of the basis of the testimony. The four factors
are: (1) testability (both whether the scientific methodology can be
tested and whether it actually has been tested), (2) whether the
methodology has been subjected to peer review, (3) the existence of
methodological standards and the rate of error, and (4) general ac55. Id. at 899 (majority opinion).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of “Future Dangerousness” Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho, 37
AKRON L. REV. 469, 469-70 (2004).
60. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
61. See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 367-69 (2003); Regnier, supra note 59, at 493-95.
62. Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger:
Why Expert Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases Are Unconstitutional, 44
B.C. L. REV. 207, 226 (2002).
63. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test only
allowed entry of evidence that had gained “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific
field. Id.
64. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89.
65. See id. at 593-94.
66. See id. at 593-95.
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ceptance of the methodology in the field.67 If the testimony fails every
factor or is otherwise not relevant, the judge should exclude it. 68 Acting in this manner, the judge functions as a gatekeeper, allowing
only reliable and relevant information to reach the jury. 69
C. A Future Dangerousness Standard?
How does Daubert affect future dangerousness testimony? While
it expressly overruled the existing standard for the admission of expert testimony in federal cases, Daubert, a federal case, does not apply to state criminal cases or to federal or state sentencing proceedings. 70 There are several reasons, however, why applying Daubert’s
“general observations” to sentencing proceedings would be logical.
Because death is an absolute and severe punishment, allowing the
admission of relevant information during the sentencing stage is
paramount. 71 Since Daubert’s review is broad, it encourages the admission of relevant information. Courts also require that evidence used
to weigh a decision as severe as execution be reliable. 72 Daubert encourages a thorough review of the methods, and by excluding irrelevant or
baseless testimony, a judge using Daubert protects reliability.
Given that “death is different” 73 than other sentences due to its
severity and irreversibility, courts should have comprehensive admissibility guidelines that ensure the decision to impose death is
well-informed. Put more directly, if proceedings where death is not
contemplated require the thorough Daubert standard, proceedings
that contemplate the more severe punishment of execution should
logically require a review standard with at least the same level of
caution. Some states, such as Texas, have recognized this argument
and essentially adopted Daubert. 74 While the Supreme Court has not
addressed this position, this Comment proceeds on the assertion that
Daubert should apply in death penalty proceedings. 75
67. See id. at 593-94.
68. See id. at 592-95.
69. See id. at 597.
70. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464 n.10 (5th Cir.
2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (“It is well settled that, in the federal courts, the rules of evidence generally do not apply at a sentencing hearing, even one in which the death penalty
is a possibility.”); see also G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 974 (1996).
71. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976).
72. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 61, at 358-59.
73. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
74. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995);
see also Regnier, supra note 59, at 495.
75. For additional discussion on why Daubert should apply, see Beecher-Monas, supra
note 61, at 360-85; see also Lisa M. Dennis, Note, Constitutionality, Accuracy, Admissibility: Assessing Expert Predictions of Future Violence in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 10
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 292, 312-14 (2002).
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D. Future Dangerousness Now
Future dangerousness has marched ahead despite the Daubert
uncertainty, court confusion, 76 scholarly criticism, 77 and professional
condemnation. 78 Although some states, such as Mississippi, do not
permit a consideration of future dangerousness, 79 three states—
Oregon, Texas, and Virginia–expressly require a finding of future dangerousness before imposing a sentence of execution. 80 Twenty-one additional states use future dangerousness as an aggravating factor. 81
States are not alone in this consideration; juries almost always
consider whether a given defendant will pose a continuing threat to
society, even if the prosecutor neither introduces evidence on nor
says anything about future dangerousness. 82 Furthermore, jury consideration of future dangerousness is not in passing; in determining
what sentence to impose, jurors spend more time discussing future
dangerousness than any other factor save the facts of the crime. 83 As
the debate among both mental health professionals and legal scholars illustrates, future dangerousness is an issue that is ripe for Supreme Court review.
V. THE PERMISSIBILITY OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
The use of mental health professional testimony regarding future
dangerousness invokes several important constitutional questions.
In the last few decades, it has become increasingly clear that the
science behind some future dangerousness predictions is generally
problematic. 84 Why, then, has it been permitted to remain in the
judicial system?
Courts may have thus far refused to exclude mental health professional testimony because they believed that future dangerousness
is a valuable consideration in criminal sentencing and that psychologists and psychiatrists seemed the best equipped to testify about it. 85
76. See supra Part III.A.
77. See, e.g., La Fontaine, supra note 62, at 238-43.
78. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899-903 (1983) (referring to the APA’s
amicus brief condemning judicial reliability on psychiatric testimony in future dangerousness considerations).
79. See Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 748 (Miss. 1992).
80. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 §
2(e)(1) (Vernon 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2007).
81. Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 479. For a partial list of states, see id. at
479 n.48.
82. See John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always “At Issue,” 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398-99 (2001).
83. Id. at 404.
84. At least this is the case for unstructured clinical assessment. See Monahan, supra
note 10, at 394.
85. The Supreme Court in Barefoot implied a similar position when it said that “it
makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons
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Casting out the whole lot of expert testimony would deprive a jury
facing a tough future dangerousness question of the best information
modern science can furnish. Thus, faced with choosing between
abandoning a desirable sentencing tool (future dangerousness) and
relying on unsteady analytical tools (psychological testing), courts
prefer the latter.
However, courts no longer face this dilemma. Instead of discarding all future dangerousness analysis, certain types of future dangerousness predictions could be excluded without emptying the judicial
tool belt of all future dangerousness utilities. For example, courts
might choose to exclude clinical methods, while allowing actuarial
tools. This is one potentially viable option. But in excluding clinical
methods, courts would also surely contemplate the numerous objections raised against future dangerousness as a whole. This Part collects six such objections advanced by commentators that the courts
might consider.
A. Relevance
The argument against future dangerousness stemming from relevance grounds goes something like this: to be relevant in criminal
sentencing, information must be reliable. 86 Death penalty sentencing
procedures require a heightened level of reliability for information to
be relevant and thus admissible. 87 Since death is a final, irreversible
punishment, courts strictly require that the jury only use accurate
information with probative value in making its decision. Given the
severity and corresponding high standards of capital trials, future dangerousness testimony is too inaccurate to be relied upon and therefore
has little probative value. It threatens to bias the jury. Thus, future
dangerousness evidence is problematic and should be excluded.88
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that juries should
receive only accurate information during the sentencing phase of
death penalty trials. 89 In Gregg, the Court stated that “accurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned
determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.” 90 Indeed,
only a reasoned, noncapricious system is constitutional. 91 The relevant question, then, is whether future dangerousness predictions
who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject that they
should not be permitted to testify.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983).
86. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
87. See id.
88. For a version of this argument primarily concerning clinical assessment, see Regnier, supra note 59, at 502-04.
89. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 188-89.
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qualify as reliable.
Under the Daubert standard, the most accurate answer is that
many future dangerousness tools meet this requirement, but some do
not. As discussed supra Part III.A, clinical assessment methods are
generally problematic. By applying the four considerations in
Daubert—testability, peer review, the presence of methodological
standards, and general acceptance—it is clear clinical assessment
should be excluded. 92 First, clinical assessment methods cannot readily be tested. Second, clinical assessment methods cannot be subjected to peer review (and have not been). Third, methodological
standards do not really exist beyond a clinician-to-clinician basis.
And fourth, rather than being generally accepted, the profession has
almost unanimously rejected the use of clinical assessment methods. 93 The relevance argument directed against clinical assessment is
thus both accurate and commendable. However, the relevance argument leads to a different conclusion when directed against actuarial
tools. Consider, for example, the VRAG.
The VRAG passes all four of the Daubert factors and should therefore not be excluded. It is a testable instrument; it has been validated
repeatedly by its authors and peers; 94 it possesses clear methodological standards, including error rates; and it has been generally accepted in the scientific community. 95 Because the VRAG has been
shown to be accurate and reliable, it is a suitable tool for judicial
adoption, even in light of the exacting evidentiary standards present
in death penalty sentencing.
The VRAG, however, is only one of several actuarial tools, and a
separate Daubert inquiry would be required for each prior to use in
any future dangerousness consideration. There should be no general
presumption towards the accuracy of actuarial methods; only those
tools carefully constructed and repeatedly verified are suitable for
judicial use. As long as each tool is carefully scrutinized by a gatekeeping judge, actuarially-informed future dangerousness predictions will be relevant, admissible evidence.
Finally, even assuming tools like the VRAG meet the Daubert
standard, some commentators argue that Daubert is not scrutinizing
enough. 96 Daubert is not a perfect test, and it requires the courts to
undertake a sometimes daunting review of scientific matters. But
Daubert is a comprehensive review and is the best standard currently available. This Comment does not suggest Daubert is a judi92. See Regnier, supra note 59, at 494.
93. See id. at 495.
94. See Harris et al., supra note 16.
95. See id.
96. See Regnier, supra note 59, at 504-05 (arguing that Daubert is too porous to exclude clinical assessment).
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cial ambrosia. It simply argues that if future dangerousness is to be
relied upon, it should be analyzed with the best, most comprehensive
standard available. For now, Daubert is such.
B. Individualized Assessment
The sentencing process must permit consideration of the “character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death.” 97 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized this sort of “individualized assessment” as essential in death penalty sentencing. 98 However, the Court has not indicated in detail what it means by an “individualized assessment”
and has never clarified how it pertains to future dangerousness. In
particular, since several of the methods informing the empirical component of a future dangerousness assessment rely on statistics, and
therefore sample data, 99 it is unclear how strictly “individualized” a
sentencing determination must be. 100 The argument against future
dangerousness based on individualized assessment grounds claims
that the use of sample data equates to a nonindividualized assessment and thus is prohibited in capital sentencing. 101
Actuarial risk assessment examines the traits of the defendant
and is clearly concerned with the particular individual before the
court. It is, after all, that specific defendant’s traits, conduct, and circumstances that tests like the VRAG are designed to score. However,
those traits are only meaningful in the context of the actuarial assessment because they statistically relate to other people in the sample data that informs the test. It is true, in part, that risk assessment
is not individualized because it explicitly considers the defendant as
compared to often hundreds of other individuals. 102 The same could
be said, however, for any psychological assessment tool. Even one
that relies solely on a mental health professional’s intuition could not
avoid this “collective” consideration, because clinical intuition will
97. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
98. See id. at 303-05. But see id. at 321-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
individualized assessments are not required).
99. Sample data here refers to the data from the participants in a particular test. For
example, the VRAG collected data from over 600 individuals and conducted statistical
analysis to identify the most predictive traits those individuals possessed. These predictions come from the sample of 600, but are assumed to apply to the general population (or
at least to those similar to the sample). Thus, when a defendant is scored on the VRAG, he
is being compared to the sample used to create it, or the “sample data.” Some commentators advancing this position refer to it as “population data,” but population data is a term
of art that refers to data from a sample that is generalized to (theoretically) apply to the
public. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 141-47.
100. See Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 485-90.
101. See id.
102. The VRAG was formed by analyzing over 600 individuals. See supra Part III.B.
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likely be based, at least in part, on the given clinician’s prior experience treating individuals. 103 In a strict sense, psychology as a field is
informed by and based on statistical analysis of sample data of hundreds of thousands of people.
The argument against future dangerousness testimony as “collective” is advanced by Claussen-Schulz, Pearce, and Schopp, although
their argument primarily concerns reaching dispositive conclusions
using actuarial methods and does not stretch as far as the debate is
carried in this Comment. 104 Two breeds of this argument are discussed here: (1) the fallacy of division and (2) the more general question of what the Court meant when it required “individualized assessment.” Although the two overlap in their details, each merits a
separate analysis to evaluate individualized assessment concerns.
1. Fallacy of Division
A “fallacy of division” is a logical error in which one concludes that
person X possesses qualities which others in X’s class possess because X is a member of that class. 105 The fallacy of division lends itself well to an example: “Heads of state are highly likely to be married, the pope is [a] head of state, therefore, the pope is highly likely
to be married.” 106 The pope is determined to likely be married because he is a member of the “head of state” class, but clearly he is not
likely to be married. This is a fallacy of division. The terms “trait”
and “class” can be used interchangeably in this contemplation; the
Pope’s “head of state” class status could also be called a trait. Ultimately, the fallacy of division is concerned with using one trait or
class membership to deduce the existence of other traits or class
memberships. 107 Actuarial tools such as the VRAG do not encourage
dispositive conclusions, but do claim a 100% probability for certain
score results. 108 Realistically, juries facing a claimed-100% probability may feel compelled to conclude that future dangerousness exists.
Thus, the VRAG risks functioning as a dispositive prediction.
Future dangerousness assessments initially appear to fall prey to
the fallacy of division. The VRAG was developed by looking at a class
(people who were released and had reoffended) and identifying traits
103. “Collective,” as used here, means that the clinician does not evaluate the individual in a vacuum and thus the assessment is potentially not sufficiently individualized.
104. See Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 485-86.
105. See id. at 486. See e.g., JAMES WILLIAM LETT, SCIENCE, REASON, AND
ANTHROPOLOGY 65 (Rowman & Littlefield 1997).
106. Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 486.
107. “[I]t is improper to apply [the results of a sample-based tool] as dispositive in the
capital sentencing context, because the capital sentencing decision must always be applied
to the individual who is being sentenced.” Id.
108. For the VRAG, the probability of a repeat violent offense reported for category 9 is
1.00. See supra Part III.B and accompanying table.
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they possess (those traits most predictive of violence). When later using the VRAG in an assessment, a defendant who has some number
of these traits is predicted to belong to a class—that is, the defendant
is predicted to be violent in the future based on traits he possesses. Is
this actually a fallacy of division? Probably not.
The fallacy of division argument often focuses on simplistic errors,
such as where a single trait (being a head of state) is used to predict
membership in a class (being married). Future dangerousness risk
assessments typically do not commit so obvious an error. The VRAG,
for instance, uses several traits, scores both plusses and minuses (for
example, +5 for severe elementary school maladjustment, but -1 if no
maladjustment), 109 and categorizes participants into nine different
categories with varying probabilities of repeat offending. 110 Other
tools also involve complex consideration of traits. For example, the
COVR software is adaptive, and the answer to one question alters
which question is subsequently presented. 111 Actuarial tools thus
rely on multiple traits to make predictions, and this complex
analysis enables accurate prediction. Since actuarial tools use
multiple traits to predict class status, they diverge from the typical fallacy of division example.
It is not clear, however, that actuarial risk assessment tools avoid
the problems raised by the fallacy of division simply because they use
multiple factors to predict membership in the “future dangerous”
class. It may be argued that the fallacy of division also applies to
convoluted logic trees involving multiple traits. For instance, the following trait trends may all exist: heads of states are likely to be married, public figures are likely to be married, financially secure individuals are likely to be married, and males over fifty are likely to be
married. Using these traits, a “marriage prediction test” on the Pope
would fail; the Pope possesses all four of these factors, but is not
married. Predicting that he is married would be a sophisticated fallacy of division, but still a fallacy.
But the error is also obvious: our marriage prediction test did not
take the right factors into consideration. It should have also considered religious affiliation (and related celibacy) and a whole host of
other traits and circumstances. If it had, it would have more accurately predicted the Pope’s marital status. The “fallacy” is in the
test—not necessarily the theory.
Actuarial tools are generally created by statistical methods, such

109. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 283-85, app. A.
110. See supra Part III.B and accompanying table.
111. See Monahan, supra note 10, at 412.
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as regression analysis, 112 that evaluate several factors and identify
those with the greatest predictive value. 113 The fallacy of division is
thus increasingly unlikely because actuarial tools are not picking
random traits, but instead are picking those traits that are most predictive and using them in tandem.
There is also direct conflict between the success of a given assessment tool and the allegation that it falls prey to any fallacy, because a prediction is only a fallacy if it is wrong. 114 If it is an error to
predict class membership based on a host of traits correlated with
that class, then the peer-reviewed, repeatedly successful predictions
of class membership must be explained. Even if fallacies of division
are possible, the predictive success of future dangerousness tools
suggests that such tools are not committing this logical error. If the
thrust of the fallacy of division argument is that actuarial tools will
simply be mistaken, then the argument should be presented as an attack on accuracy. Certainly inaccurate tools should not be used; the
VRAG, however, appears to be accurate.
Finally, the fallacy of division argument assumes that there are
no traits that definitively predict class membership—in other words,
that the equivalent of causation does not exist. If certain classes all
share a given trait or certain traits always predict membership in a
class, it would not be erroneous to recognize this predictive link. If,
for example, all Michigan football fans were actually allergic to buckeye nuts, it would not be a fallacy to predict that serving buckeyes to
Michigan fans would lead to their becoming sick. This hypothetical,
of course, illustrates actual causation; the nuts are causing the sickness. What the VRAG might capture is effective causation, that is, a
consistent, overwhelming impact of circumstances.
As a matter of theory, it would not be a fallacy to use predictive
traits that actually caused other traits. Probably no such traits exist—the traits studied in the VRAG probably do not actually cause
individuals to commit violent crimes. This Comment does not argue
that actual causality is real. But what the VRAG and tests like it ask
is if there could be traits or circumstances that always, 115 or nearly

112. Regression analysis is a statistical tool that identifies the best fit between two sets
of data. In other words, regression tools analyze the interaction between the two sets of
data and identify any relationship to each other. By understanding the relationship, regression analysis informs prediction. See e.g., FREDERICK J. GRAVETTER & LARRY B.
WALLNAW, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 556-69 (5th ed. Wadsworth 2000).
113. For example, the VRAG uses approximately fifty factors. See Monahan, supra
note 10, at 410.
114. Of course, individual predictions may be correct by fluke, and so the standard
must be much higher—of the scale contemplated by peer review and study repetitions.
115. “Always” serves an interesting illustrative point here, but in reality, it is very
unlikely there are any such traits. Perhaps there are traits that nearly always link with
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always, correctly predict whether a defendant will commit a future
violent act. If the answer is yes, the fallacy of division is inapplicable.
As is discussed below, just because a test can predict the mistakes
someone will make does not mean the person did not choose to make
the mistakes. While notions of free will suggest that there are no
traits that “cause” recidivism, if tests like the VRAG can actually
predict near 100% probabilities 116 it is worth contemplating whether
a certain subset of circumstances has so severe an impact on individuals that they are driven to violence. 117
In summary, the fallacy of division strain of the individual assessment argument seems to be inapplicable to future dangerousness. Because actuarial tools rely on many traits to predict class
membership, because such tools rarely function in a dispositive manner, and because some actuarial tools appear able to accurately predict recidivism, the fallacy of division argument should not prevent
the use of future dangerousness testimony.
2. Individualized Assessment Generally and Discretion
The second type of the individualized assessment argument is
more general and inquires what the Supreme Court meant when it
required an “individualized assessment” in Lockett v. Ohio, 118 Penry
v. Lynaugh, 119 Woodson, 120 and Jurek. 121 Did it mean that the defendant cannot be compared to others via sample data-based statistics?
Likely, the Court intended no such application of its individual assessment requirement given the context of the phrase’s use. In each
case, the Court was largely concerned with the removal of discretion
by the statutes at issue. But future dangerousness as a whole does
not involve a removal of discretion, nor does its empirical component,
risk assessment, prevent juries from exercising discretion in the
normative component. Risk assessment simply provides a statistical
prediction of the defendant’s likelihood of recidivism; it aims to give
the jury more information upon which to exercise its discretion.
Does individualized assessment, separate from the fallacy of division argument, forbid the use of sample data? Presumably the answer is no, as revealed in part by the discussion supra Part V.B.
classes, but free will, assuming it exists, would dictate that there may be exceptions to
every “always.” See infra Part V.G.
116. Category 9 of the VRAG is associated with a probability of 1.0. Of course, less than
1% of those the VRAG was based on fell into this category, so it is highly uncertain if such a
100% chance is accurate. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, app. A at 240, app. C at 245.
117. If nothing else, it would be valuable to direct additional resources to preventing
such circumstances from occurring.
118. 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).
119. 492 U.S. 302, 316-17 (1989).
120. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
121. 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976).
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Comparing a defendant to others does not deny him an individualized assessment; rather, it informs that assessment. Arguing that
the Court’s “individualized assessment” language requires a defendant to be considered in a vacuum is illogical; making any decision
requires contemplation of other similar decisions.
The best way for juries to predict the defendant’s future dangerousness is comparison to other situations which jury members have
experienced. Whether this comparison is on the micro scale (such as
where a jury member compares the defendant to the member’s own
life experiences) or on a larger, institutionalized scale (such as actuarial methods that factor in hundreds of people) seems immaterial.
In fact, the latter—actuarial methods with hundreds of people—
seems preferable because, with a larger group of experiences drawn
from the actuarial data, the jury is more likely to get an accurate result. But even with a jury relying only on its own experiences, the
end result is that, in sentencing the defendant, the jury will consider
experiences that are not “individualized” to the defendant. The ability to make reasoned comparisons is at the heart of jury discretion.
Because the use of sample data does not mean the process is “unindividualized,” and because actuarial tools aid discretion, such tools
satisfy the individualized assessment requirement.
C. Forbidden Factors
All risk assessment methods rely on various factors or traits to
reach a conclusion about future dangerousness. Clinical assessment
may even rely on such factors, either intuitively or explicitly (as is
the case with actuarial methods). 122 One argument against future
dangerousness is that it relies on traits that are not judicially permissible. 123 While a relevance analysis is concerned only with the scientific validity of such traits, this “forbidden factors” analysis considers whether they are forbidden despite their predictive power. The
criticisms tend to focus on three factor types: race, gender, and traits
that do not index blameworthiness. This Comment does not dispute
that factors such as race and gender are problematic in several obvious ways, but since many actuarial tools—including the VRAG—do
not rely on gender or race, the primary objection is to factors that do
not index blameworthiness.
It is important to clarify that the consideration here is not
whether these factors are useful in risk assessment. Risk assessment
122. The HCR Checklist, a structured interview, is transparent as to the factors to be
considered. See CHRISTOPHER D. WEBSTER ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH, LAW, & POL’Y INST.,
HCR-20: ASSESSING RISK FOR VIOLENCE 11 (Version 2) (1995) (cited in Monahan, supra
note 10, at 410-11 n.77).
123. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 10, at 427-35.
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tools are based on whatever traits are found to be most predictive,
and mental health professionals may generally use whatever traits
they choose. But in the judicial arena, the question is not just the
scientific utility of factors, but also their legal permissibility. We turn
now to this concern.
Are factors that do not index blame permissible? Suppose that
there exists a risk assessment tool, a survey perhaps, that predicts
with 97% accuracy who will commit serious violent acts in the next
ten years. Now suppose that this same survey uses as one of its predictive criteria a factor that does not index blameworthiness (a
“blame-free factor”). A blame-free factor could be any trait that a person possesses but that they are not culpable for possessing, such as
having blond hair, being under 35, or even liking the colors blue and
maize. For reasons unknown, working in conjunction with other factors this blame-free factor is potently predictive. May this survey be
used in a judicial setting?
At least one state supreme court has held that the use of blameindexing factors is permissible, 124 but it is unclear if blame-free factors are also permissible traits for future dangerousness analysis.
Leading commentators on future dangerousness have concluded that
the use of factors that do not index blameworthiness is improper,
noting that it seems odd to punish a defendant more harshly because
of things beyond his control. 125 After all, why should a defendant receive a harsher sentence because his parents separated before he
reached age sixteen?
Technically, the escalation of punishment is not actually tuned
towards those circumstances beyond the defendant’s control. The
harsher sentence is imposed because he is likely to be dangerous in
the future, not because his parents divorced. It is not the event (the
divorce) that triggers punishment, it is the effect the event has on
the person –an effect the individual can control. 126 This distinction
may seem narrow, but it is essential; we return to it in discussing
124. Joseph v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Va. 1995) (considering prior
crimes in future dangerousness determinations as not a violation of double jeopardy).
125. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 10, at 427-28. (“Retribution deeply colors the implementation of all sentencing schemes, including those whose avowed goals include crime
control. . . . Given this state of affairs, the use of violence risk factors in sentencing . . .
should be limited to those that index the extent or seriousness of the defendant’s prior
criminal conduct.”).
126. The immediate question, then, is if they can control it, how can an actuarial tool
accurately predict future dangerousness? This question is addressed more in later portions
of this Comment, but for now, the briefest answer is actuarial tools predict what will
probably happen based on a host of events. A related question is why is the effect of a
blame-free event a legitimate tool? Again, the shortest answer is that society seems to
assume that a person is the master of his or her own response to even horrible events.
However, such events would likely also have a place, as discussed infra, in mitigating
evidence considerations.
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free will infra. Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the reality that factors beyond the defendant’s control are leading to a harsher sentence,
perhaps even execution.
But if future dangerousness itself is constitutionally permissible,
blame-free factors should be as well. The argument against future
dangerousness’ reliance on blame-free factors is that events that do
not index blame cannot be used to punish. But future dangerousness
itself does not index blame; no matter how it is determined, future
dangerousness is intended to punish on the basis of the defendant’s
future, a future that is blame-free until it occurs. 127 When a jury sentences a defendant to death in part for the danger he poses in the future, it is punishing him for something he has never done, something
for which he has not accrued any blame. If the use of future dangerousness is permissible to punish for the blame-free future, reliance on
blame-free factors should also be permissible for the same reasons.
Perhaps future dangerousness’ blame-free basis is acceptable—
either actually permissible or justified by its usefulness—but we still
wish only to predict using blameworthy factors. Following this preference may be very costly to the predictive ability of actuarial tools.
The VRAG, for example, relies on several factors that do not index
blame, including separation from biological parents, age, presence of
a personality disorder, and presence of schizophrenia. The VRAG
also uses factors that involve the defendant’s choices but may not involve blame, such as elementary school maladjustment (including attendance problems), history of alcohol problems (including parental
alcoholism), and marital status. The VRAG, which was created by
identifying the best predictors out of several dozen, would be severely
undermined by a requirement that only blameworthy factors be used.
The objection that the blame-free basis of future dangerousness is
permissible but the use blame-free factors is not is thus an argument
that such factors should not be used, rather than that they may not
be used. If there is no judicial prohibition against using future dangerousness, there should not be a prohibition against using its
blame-free factors. Even if the use of blame-free factors is undesirable, because there is no prohibition against their use and the reliability of the determination (and therefore its admissibility) thus far
depends upon them, the judiciary should still permit them.
If, however, blame-indexing factors are equally or more predictive,
it remains a reasonable preference that only blame-indexing factors
127. Or is it? Is there blame to be attached for acts that have not, but objectively will,
occur? If I drop your favorite vase towards the floor, is it not blameworthy until it reaches
the floor sometime in the future? If I drop it from the top of the Empire State building, are
you prohibited from scolding me for breaking it until it actually breaks? There is a chance
that some event will intercede; I may dive after it, absorb the blow, and die to save the
vase. May you only scold me for placing your vase in danger of breaking after it falls?
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be used. The key question, then, is whether actuarial tools using
blame-indexing factors are as accurate as tools using blame-free factors. If they are not, since courts do not bar blame-free factors, something more than a preference will be necessary to justify the use of
less accurate actuarial tools. Only time and subsequent risk assessment studies will tell if blame-free factors are equally predictive.
Despite the inability of statistics to prove causation, the VRAG’s
blame-free factors are highly predictive, likely because the events
these factors measure have a great impact on the defendant. Blamefree factors measure events in the defendant’s life, such as abuse or
parental separation, which are generally recognized as beyond his
control. But unless notions of free will are discarded, the effects of
those events on the defendant are not beyond his control. If free will
means anything, it is a person’s ability to choose to transcend one’s
surroundings and become the person he or she wants to be. The predictive power of blame-free factors remains, despite the existence of
free will, because presumably people often do not succeed at resisting
the effects of adverse events, especially when several occur. This is
certainly an unfortunate fact if true, but it is not one that undermines future dangerousness analysis.
It is, however, an observation that compels caution. While the
criminal justice system does not halt before a defendant’s submission
to powerfully negative influences, it should and does have sympathy
for the defendant in the contemplation of mitigating factors. When
given risk assessment results, a jury should be given an instruction
directing them to consider whether the defendant has escaped the
negative influences of his past. Defense counsel may argue, using
whatever character or other mitigating evidence is available, that
this defendant will not be a future danger because he has escaped
their influence, or that he is different than the sample population.
The opportunity to present these and other arguments is protected
by the requirement that mitigating factors be considered in capital
sentencing proceedings. These are the sort of adversarial protections the Supreme Court likely relied on. And they certainly
should not be overlooked.
In summary, given their apparent predictive power and the lack
of a prohibition, blame-free factors can and should be used. The use
of blame-indexing factors, however, would be a reasonable alternative if they create equally accurate predictive tools. Time will tell if
this is the case. In the interim, any preference for blame-indexing
factors should give way when blame-free factors are superior predictors, especially in light of the heightened need for accurate tools in
death penalty sentencing. And given the severity of a death penalty,
defense lawyers should make certain the jury understands the limits
of actuarial prediction.
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D. Vagueness
Vagueness arguments question the specificity of statutes. When a
statute such as the Texas death penalty statute requires that the
jury conclude beyond a reasonable doubt there is “a probability” the
defendant will repeat offend in the future, what does “a probability”
mean? 128 Does this language give juries sufficient guidance in answering the question? How is “a probability” proved beyond a reasonable
doubt? These questions are prime examples of the vagueness argument.
The Supreme Court has reviewed the “a probability” language and
declined to condemn it. 129 Still, such language is problematic because
there is a probability of everything. Statistically speaking, there is a
probability that a thousand monkeys with typewriters will actually
produce the works of Shakespeare. 130 But that probability, while it
may exist, is very small. 131 Still, a jury may feel compelled to answer
the question in the affirmative, based on the fact that there is some
possibility that a person will commit a violent act in the future. A
better approach would be to require the jury to conclude there is a
“meaningful probability” or “substantial probability” of future violence or to adopt a percentage level at which it considers the possibility of recidivism sufficient to conclude a person is a future danger.
Vagueness arguments correctly suggest that simply requiring a
finding of “a probability” is problematic and that additional guidance is necessary. The next question is obvious: what level of probability is sufficient? 132
If state legislatures hesitate when faced with the question of how
much risk is enough, a jury will have even more difficulty answering
the question. Legislatures may assemble dozens of experts and panels, review thousands of pages of findings, and commission studies;
they have the ability to gather a variety of resources to answer the
question. Juries have no such power; they may rely only on the evi128. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 37.071 (Vernon 2007).
129. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-24 (1989); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
272-74 (1976).
130. It was once possible to test this theory yourself using the Monkey Shakespeare Simulator, which simulated monkeys banging on keyboards. See The Monkey Shakespeare Simulator, http://web.archive.org/web/20040603094742/http://user.tninet.se/~ecf599g/aardasnails/
(last visited Aug. 28, 2007) (archived version of the original website). The record as of December 4, 2005 (before the original site went down) was reportedly twenty-four letters from
Henry IV part 2.
131. Id. This webpage posits,
The odds against monkeys typing Shakespeare by chance are astronomical.
With about 80 typewriter keys, the chance of getting the first letter right is
about 80 to 1. The chance of getting 2 letters right is 1 in 80×80, or 6400 to 1.
Each letter increases the odds against by 80 times. The odds of getting 10 letters right is about 11 million million million to 1.
Id.
132. See infra Part VII.A for a discussion on what juries are to do with various percentages.
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dence presented to them. And while the question for a legislature is
largely abstract, the decision for a jury is very real. A particular defendant will live or die based on the jury’s answer to the question of
how much risk is enough.
Yet, if a legislature does utilize its resources and statutorily quantifies how much risk is enough, the statute may be struck down for
denying the jury the required level of discretion. Exactly how much
discretion is required is generally unknown. But given the constitutional vagueness concerns, legislatures should at least adopt the
“meaningful probability” or “substantial probability” language, or instead provide specific guidance on what level of risk is appropriate.
Whatever path a legislature takes, the use of “a probability” alone is
insufficient, and the question of how much risk is enough is problematic. However, despite the difficulty of the question, it is one which
the resource-laden legislature should assist in answering.
E. Predestination
Another argument against the use of future dangerousness is that
it adopts the principle of predestination. 133 If the defendant cannot
choose a different path, then he lacks free will and is therefore not
culpable for his actions. 134 The argument claims that future dangerousness, in asserting a probability that the defendant will commit
another violent act, denies the existence of his free will and ability to
choose a different path. The argument continues that, if future dangerousness is going to adopt the deterministic position that the defendant will definitely commit an act in the future, then he is not
culpable for that act because he did not choose to do it. Therefore, future
dangerousness proponents should be against punishment of blameless
defendants based on their predictions (or so the argument goes).
This argument confuses predestination with accurate prediction,
and the difference is vital. Predestination is where an individual has
no choice, no control over his actions, and will invariably arrive at a
given destination without deviation. Accurate prediction, on the
other hand, correctly identifies the destination at which an individual will arrive, but says nothing about how he will get there. If future
dangerousness relied on a predestination model, the defendant would
not be morally culpable because such predictions would assume his
actions are beyond his control. But that is not reality. 135
133. Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 948 n.6 (1975) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Interestingly, even if events were predestined and no person had control over his
or her actions, the criminal justice system would likely continue to function. If, by some
remarkable discovery, it was revealed to all humankind that no one had free will, would
society simply stop locking up those who murdered, raped, and assaulted? Perhaps. But it
is more likely that things would continue largely as they do now. After all, the end result—
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Instead, future dangerousness predicts what destination an individual will arrive at of his own volition. When a wife tells her husband to arrive for a 6:30 dinner at 6:15 because she is confident he
will be late, if he is in fact late, this is not predestination. Instead, it
is skilled, informed prediction; the wife knows her husband so well
that she can predict that the sum of his volitional choices will result
in his being late to dinner. Although future dangerousness concerns
substantially more severe matters than punctuality, it does the same
sort of thing: it considers the sum of the defendant’s individual factors and predicts a result. Depending on the tool’s accuracy, the defendant either will or will not validate that prediction. If he does, it
will be because the sum of his choices produced the result, not because future dangerousness tapped into some predestinationprediction spring. Thus, future dangerousness concerns the defendant’s voluntary choices.
Future dangerousness risk assessment acknowledges free will in
its percentage predictions. While certain traits are predictive, they
are not always definitive, hence the generally less-than-100%-chance
predictions. Because risk assessment only uses accurate predictions
and does not assume predestination, its use is permissible.
F. Non-Retributive
The United States criminal justice system is based on both utilitarian and retributive grounds. Blackstone penned that “punishments are chiefly intended for the prevention of future crimes.”136
But conversely, Monahan has observed that “[r]etribution deeply colors the implementation of all sentencing schemes, including those
whose avowed goals include crime control.” 137 Whereas most of the
criminal justice system involves a blend of both utilitarian and retributive objectives, future dangerousness is based primarily on utilitarian, preventative grounds. Because future dangerousness contemplates an increase in punishment based on an uncommitted act, the
nonretributive argument claims that the use of future dangerousness
is impermissible. The nonretributive argument thus overlaps with
the forbidden factor, blame-free traits, and predestination arguments
previously discussed. An iconic representation of this argument is
the following statement: “Your past crimes have earned you at least
life in prison. [Your future dangerousness may earn you death].” 138
either continue sentencing criminals or stop sentencing criminals—would be predetermined. If society were to continue sentencing criminals, then those predestined to be deterred would paradoxically require the existence of a deterrent mechanism—the continuation of sentencing. Such speculation quickly devolves into convoluted, abstract questions.
136. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *16.
137. Monahan, supra note 10, at 427-28.
138. Regnier, supra note 59, at 476.
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The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are “theoretically agnostic
about why we punish.” 139 The Supreme Court thus far has indicated
that the preventive emphasis is permissible; even when the escalation of punishment has arguably hinged on future dangerousness
considerations, the death penalty statute at issue was upheld. 140
More generally, faced with a defendant who has made blatant
threats and credible indications that he will kill or rape if released,
the criminal justice system is pressed to find some way to preventively detain him.
The non-retributive argument fails, however, for three reasons.
First, to the extent it claims that future dangerousness’ premises are
simply improper, prior sections of this Comment and the preventative aspect of punishment undermine it. Second, the argument is incomplete: the statement “it is improper to punish based on nonretributive future dangerousness” is a conclusion without a premise.
Again, the premises that would seem to most often accompany this
argument were discussed earlier in this Part. 141 Third, many longaccepted procedures in the criminal justice system contemplate
events which have not yet occurred. Bail considerations contemplate
the future risk of flight, and if the tribunal determines there is a sufficient probability the defendant will flee, bail may be set astronomically high or denied entirely. 142 Parole and probation also contemplate future dangerousness. 143 For these three reasons, the nonretributive argument does not preclude use of future dangerousness.
Still, if the first two reasons were to be proven false, could the
non-retributive argument be rejected solely on the grounds that
other accepted aspects of the criminal justice system use future dangerousness (bail, parole, and probation)? Perhaps. The rationale that
future dangerousness is permissible for capital sentencing because
other areas of the criminal justice system rely on it is a sort of stage
magician maneuver; it moves to justify a controversial practice simply by pointing to other procedures that also use it. A fair response to
this argument is that future dangerousness is an inappropriate tool
in all uses, it just hasn’t been criticized as much for bail, parole, and
probation uses. But again, this is a conclusion without a premise. If
future dangerousness cannot be used, what is the reason?
139. Monahan, supra note 10, at 397.
140. See Regnier, supra note 59, at 478-80 (discussing the Court’s upholding of the
Texas death penalty statute in Jurek despite the question of execution turning on future
dangerousness considerations).
141. Those premises that immediately come to mind being (1) it is improper because
the American system of justice is purely retributive, (2) it is improper because a nonretributive approach uses “blame-free” or other forbidden factors, or (3) it is improper because non-retributive factors are unreliable. Each of these has already been addressed.
142. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976).
143. Id.
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Pragmatically, this retort that all uses of future dangerousness
are inappropriate would also be an uphill battle. Judicial predictions
about the future dangers posed by a defendant have long been a part
of the justice system. The system is rooted in such preventative
grounds, and sweeping change is unlikely. As long as the utilitarian
basis of the criminal justice system persists, future dangerousness
assessments, as a means to directly or indirectly detain dangerous
persons, are unlikely to disappear. 144
It is certainly true, however, that at least two key differences
separate bail, parole, and probation uses of future dangerousness
from its use in capital sentencing: mitigation and severity. Each merits some discussion.
1. Mitigation Versus Escalation
The first difference is that bail, parole, and probation all involve
considering a future event in order to mitigate a sentence, not escalate it. They are a type of exception—a forgiveness, almost—for an
alleged or proven wrong. Thus, the aforementioned iconic statement
is reversed in these examples: “Your crimes have earned you a harsh
outcome (e.g. two more years in jail, a $50,000 bail, or a one-year
sentence); your future acts mitigate it (e.g. release you on parole two
years early, earn you a $10,000 bail, or earn you one year of probation, respectively).”
May future dangerousness be relied upon to mitigate, but not relied upon to escalate? If so, the functional effect of this argument
against future dangerousness as nonretributive would seem to be reduced to semantics. Whether used to escalate or mitigate, the analysis turns on the existence of future dangerousness.
For example, what if state legislatures simply reworded their
statutes to adhere to the following mitigation framework: “If a defendant is not a future danger, the defendant shall be sentenced to life.”
The statute would function nearly identically to death penalty statutes that require future dangerousness as a condition precedent to
the death penalty, as a finding of no future dangerousness in either
case would require a sentence of life in prison, rather than death. It
would also likely pass constitutional muster because it would allow
for jury discretion. The end result, however, is that whether used to
escalate or mitigate, future dangerousness would hold a final say,
thereby revealing that a mitigation vs. escalation argument is form
without substance. Just like the overarching nonretributive argu144. However, its continued existence does not dictate that its continued criminal application persist. Instead, civil commitment or other statutory schemes might suffice. For a
discussion touching application in other contexts, see Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 58-62 (2003).
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ment is incomplete (it is a conclusion without a premise), so too is a
distinction based on escalation as opposed to mitigation.
If states did employ this death penalty framework, would it allow
a constitutionally permissible level of discretion? The Supreme Court
could answer this question in either direction. In Woodson, the Court
struck down the mandatory North Carolina statute, 145 but in Jurek
the Court upheld a Texas statute which essentially confined discretion to the question of future dangerousness. 146 A death penalty statute like the above example is more like the Jurek statute than the
Woodson statute. Given that the Court upheld the Jurek statute even
though its discretion was minimal, a statute that allows for discretion to mitigate a death sentence would presumably be permitted.
2. Greater Versus Lesser Severity
Capital sentencing involves a much more severe penalty than a
high bail, denial of parole, or long probation. Looking ahead at events
that are unknown may involve the same probability of success in
bail, parole, probation, and capital sentencing situations, but the cost
of error is much greater in capital sentencing. This difference impacts the issue of reliability, and thus admissibility. The argument
implies that future dangerousness evidence may be sufficiently accurate for bail, parole, and probation considerations, but that it is not
accurate enough for a matter as serious as capital sentencing. Differing evidentiary requirements respond to this concern and undercut
the Greater vs. Lesser Severity argument.
Judicial gatekeeping, via standards such as those outlined in
Daubert, is designed to screen unreliable evidence from the jury’s
consideration. Bail, parole, probation, and capital sentencing decisions each involve different costs in the event of error, and thus capital sentencing should adhere to exacting admissibility standards.
Daubert offers a gatekeeping judge an opportunity to carefully review
the future dangerousness tool at issue and, if it is insufficiently reliable, it can (and should) be excluded. The Greater vs. Lesser Severity argument thus correctly identifies that death penalty use of future dangerousness requires increased reliability and evidentiary
standards. It does not, however, dictate that future dangerousness as
a sentencing tool should be discarded.
G. Summary
Actuarial risk assessment is reliable and relevant to the difficult
question of future dangerousness which many statutes present to ju145. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976).
146. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
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ries. While actuarial tools rely on statistics, this does not result in a
lack of discretion or a “nonindividualized” assessment. Most tools do
not rely on forbidden factors such as race and gender, and those that
rely on blame-free factors are permissible since future dangerousness
itself contemplates the blame-free future. Future dangerousness does
not adopt the concept of predestination, and its nonretributive basis
is not discordant with the foundations of the United States justice
system. Finally, statutes that do not specify what “a probability” of
future dangerousness means are problematic and should be avoided
as too vague. Future dangerousness informed by risk assessment is
permissible and may be used by courts.
VI. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC SUPPORT FOR FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
If future dangerousness requires the defenses set forth at length
in the prior portions of this Comment, it begs the question “why
should courts bother with such a tool?” This Part attempts to answer
such an inquiry and begins by considering reasons why future dangerousness is useful as a general principle. It then considers some
specific examples from the literature on future dangerousness and
discusses more specifically why the use of future dangerousness in
the judicial system is desirable.
A.

General Reasons to Keep Future Dangerousness

One reason the courts should continue to allow future dangerousness testimony is because most rules of evidence provide for the admissibility of all relevant information for the jury to consider. 147 According to studies, a jury will consider the implications of future
dangerousness even if the issue does not come up at trial. 148 Therefore, accurate information that helps juries address such considerations is certainly relevant. Actuarial results are easy to comprehend
and offer valuable insights to juries. Since the jury will likely make a
future dangerousness determination whether asked to or not, they
should be given the best tools available to make that determination.
As the American Bar Association has noted, if juries are going to
consider future dangerousness, risk assessment by mental health
professionals is the best means of evidence available. 149 While some
methods, such as the clinical assessments discussed supra Part III.A,
are unreliable, the social and mental health sciences continue to

147. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403.
148. See Blume et al., supra note 82, at 398-99.
149. JOHN W. PARRY, NATIONAL BENCHBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 49 (1998).
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work to improve risk assessment tools. 150 Certainly, for states that
require juries to consider the defendant’s future dangerousness, it is
reasonable that juries be given the best information modern science
and technology have to offer. The adversarial process, gatekeeping
judges, and careful instructions to the jury will help to reduce whatever limitations the particular assessment instrument might have.
So long as the risk assessment tool is reliable, its results should be
available to juries.
Another reason to keep future dangerousness is the odd paradox
that would result from discarding it. Assume, arguendo, that one of
the above-mentioned arguments against the use of future dangerousness risk assessments is valid, such that the State could no longer
use future dangerousness evidence. Could the defendants nevertheless use such evidence if it would aid his defense? If, for instance, the
defendant scores in the lower categories on several major actuarial
tools, indicating he is unlikely to be a future danger, it may greatly
aid his case to present this evidence. The defendant potentially faces
execution, and part of the purpose of allowing a broad range of information into evidence during sentencing is to give the defendant a
full and meaningful chance to present his case. The defendant would
therefore likely be permitted to introduce future dangerousness evidence even despite whatever argument above prevailed over the use
of future dangerousness evidence generally.
But if the State could not do the same, this would create an odd
paradox where the defense could introduce evidence that the State
could not rebut with its own findings. Ultimately, this would lead to
an inequality in criminal proceedings. Thus, another reason to admit
future dangerousness evidence is that denying its availability to the
State would likely create an inequality in capital sentencing, a generally undesirable event.
In summary, future dangerousness risk assessment is a valuable
tool because it addresses a question that is both hard to answer and
that juries essentially always consider, even if not asked to. Future
dangerousness addresses a question that is of obvious importance in
sentencing defendants – will he or she be a danger to others, such as
guards, fellow inmates, or even the public should the defendant escape? While the use of future dangerousness risk assessment requires answering many complex and difficult questions, provided
those questions can be answered satisfactorily, future dangerousness
remains a valid judicial tool.

150. For an example of such an ongoing research project with the VRAG, see, e.g., Research
Risk Assessment Page, www.mhcp-research.com/ragpage.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
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B. Specific Examples: Three Future Dangerousness Candidates
Perhaps the best reason to keep future dangerousness as an analytical tool is revealed by viewing it in action. It is thus worth describing some real future dangerousness candidates, as described by
fellow commentators. 151 Consider the following individuals, both in
terms of preventative detention future dangerousness uses and its
use in death penalty sentencing:
Garry David is about to be released from prison after serving
fourteen years for shooting a woman and two police officers. 152 He
has been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, a disorder
that often leads to violent and dangerous behavioral outbursts. 153
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM-IV), describes the disorder as follows:
As an adult, the person often commits acts that are against the
law and/or fails to live up to the requirements of a job, financial responsibility, or parenting responsibilities. [Such persons] frequently are involved in alcohol and drug abuse.
....
Currently, there is no widely accepted effective method of treating sociopathic personality types. They tend to be very manipulative during treatment and tend to lie and cover up personal faults
in themselves and have little insight into their behavior patterns. 154

A tribunal has also specifically determined that Garry is “likely to be
violent if released.” 155
Leroy Hendricks is about to be released after serving time for his
fifth child molestation. 156 He has stated expressly that the only sure
way to stop him from molesting children is for him “to die.” 157 Leroy
has testified before a judge and jury, confessing he has “repeatedly
abused children whenever he was not confined.” 158 He told his treating physician, who diagnosed him with pedophilia, that “treatment is
bull----” 159 and that when he “get[s] stressed out” he “can’t control the

151. Some of the situations described infra have been previously discussed by scholars
and have been modified for their inclusion here. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 144, at 1.
152. Id. at 1 (citing C.R. Williams, Psychopathy, Mental Illness and Preventive Detention:
Issues Arising from the David Case, 16 MONASH UNIV. L. REV. 161, 162, 170-78 (1990)).
153. Id.
154. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) § 301.70 (4th ed. text revision 2000), available at
http://www.accg.net/antisocial.htm.
155. Slobogin, supra note 144, at 1 (citing Williams, supra note 152).
156. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
157. Id. at 2078; see also Slobogin, supra note 144, at 1.
158. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 2078.
159. Id. at 2079.
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urge [to molest children].” 160
John Coker was convicted and sentenced to three life terms for
two rapes, a murder, and other crimes. 161 John escaped from prison
just two years after being incarcerated, and before being recaptured
he raped another victim. 162 He told another victim he encountered,
“[I] don’t have nothing to lose—[I am in] prison for the rest of [my]
life, anyway.” 163 He has since been reapprehended. 164
Now imagine Garry, Leroy, and John are before a tribunal. Should
it be able to preventatively detain any of them? What about if they
commit some other crime and the death penalty is on the table (as it
likely already is for John Coker)? Could the State use future dangerousness evidence against them?
What if Garry later commits another crime and the following fictional facts are added to the equation: when he was last in a supermaximum-security prison, he assaulted forty-seven guards, nearly
killing twelve, and almost escaped twice. Should the tribunal be prevented from considering the danger he poses to the guards if sent
back, or to the public if he escapes?
Faced with reliable evidence that an individual is likely to commit
a crime in the future, a tribunal should be able to act to prevent the
potential harm. The justice system, as noted earlier, was partially
developed on preventative grounds. 165 The difficulty arises in defining what constitutes “reliable evidence.” But this is a reason to set
exacting evidence standards, not to completely forbid future dangerousness as an evidentiary tool. Future dangerousness is a highly useful component of criminal sentencing because it allows the judge and
jury to consider all options for defendants serving a life sentence who
feel they have “nothing to lose.” And this is only one of its uses. As
such, it is a not a tool courts should discard.
VII. A FUTURE FOR FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS SANS DR. DEATH
Future dangerousness is a useful tool, but not yet a perfect tool.
As such, controls to minimize risk should be continuously enhanced.
Several restrictions and prohibitions should be followed to ensure
fairness and minimize abuse. This Part thus contemplates developments that might aid in creating a more-ideal future dangerousness
schematic. As with the real defendants discussed above, it begins

160. Id. at 2078.
161. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 70 (3d ed. 2003).
162. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n.4.
163. Id.; see also DRESSLER, supra note 161, at 70.
164. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n.4.
165. See supra Part VI.F.2.
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with a real future dangerousness “expert.”
Dr. Grigson, one of the experts who testified in Barefoot, has been
dubbed “Dr. Death.” 166 Before his recent retirement, Grigson testified
in over 140 capital cases for the State of Texas. 167 He often testified it
was “a matter of medical certainty” 168 that the defendant would repeat offend, and sometimes even asserted such as a “one thousand
percent chance.” 169 Despite being expelled from the American Psychiatry Association and the Texas Association of Psychiatrists, he
continued to be a star witness for Texas. 170 Even in the face of DNA
evidence proving that one of the individuals he testified was certain
to reoffend was actually innocent, Dr. Grigson has maintained that
his testimony was accurate. 171
Despite the merits of future dangerousness analysis, the example
of Dr. Grigson’s testimony compels careful consideration of how the
tribunal decides to act when presented with risk assessment evidence. 172 Though Dr. Grigson has retired, the world is likely full of
similarly motivated Grigson clones that may persuade judges and juries that the future is certain to better if the defendant is locked up
or executed. 173 It is only through stringent controls that such abuse
can be minimized. We turn now to such controls.
A. Improving Future Dangerousness Considerations
When experts testify, juries give great weight to their opinions. 174
Thus, if an expert gives misleading or inaccurate testimony, jury
members may disregard the accurate opinions they themselves had
developed. Since the court has bestowed the testimony with the “expert witness” title, jury members may assume that any disagreements between what the expert thinks and what the jury member
thinks should be resolved in favor of the expert. This is not necessar166. Regnier, supra note 59, at 481; see also Jeralyn Meritt, Texas: ‘Dr. Death’ Retires,
TALKLEFT (Dec. 21, 2003), http://talkleft.com/new_archives/004754.html.
167. Regnier, supra note 59, at 481.
168. Id.
169. TEX. DEFENDER SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 30 (as modified May 22, 2003), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/state%
20of%20denial/Chap3.pdf.
170. Regnier, supra note 59, at 482.
171. Id. at 481. Interestingly, this stubbornness itself reveals a flaw. Since he made his
future dangerousness predictions based on hypothetical fact scenarios that involved the
description of the crime the defendant was being charged with, if the defendant did not
commit the crime alleged, Grigson’s prediction stands on nothing but air. That Grigson
would support such a prediction, founded on nothing at all, is highly indicative of the
worth of his testimony generally.
172. See supra Part VI.B.
173. See Regnier, supra note 59, at 482.
174. Fontaine, supra note 62, at 230; see also White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp. 851, 858
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (explaining that when a future dangerousness opinion is offered by an expert witness, such as a doctor, it has an “much greater” impact on the jury).
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ily problematic when the expert testimony is accurate, but when an
expert’s inaccurate testimony or “junk science” is given dispositive
weight, there is a serious problem. It is also problematic if the expert’s views are adopted in areas where the jury is to do the deciding,
such as normative considerations.
To avoid this, courts must stringently adhere to standards like
those in Daubert. Under the Daubert analysis, “general acceptance”
and “peer reviewed” must never be reduced to asking “are there a lot
of articles on this topic?” Methodological standard inquiries should
consider the validity of those methods as they pertain to the goal of
the technique.
Daubert should also not be presumed to be an endpoint in future
dangerousness evidence admissibility standards. Commentators from
both scientific and legal fields should continue to contemplate what a
better standard might be. All the utility of future dangerousness is
corrupted whenever the Dr. Deaths of the world are permitted to testify to “a one thousand percent [medical certainty].” 175
Experts must be screened carefully to avoid misleading the jury,
and they should also be advised to communicate their findings within
certain confines. This Comment supports the view that mental
health professionals must not be permitted to testify as to the normative aspect of the jury’s future dangerousness inquiry. 176 Mental
health professionals are no more qualified than any jury member to
conclude what level of risk is enough to determine there is a “probability” of future danger. Given the weight such expert opinion is
usually accorded, allowing an expert to opine on the normative aspect of the question severely limits the discretion jury members may
exercise. Perhaps some field of experts has a series of qualifications
that enables them to offer such advice. However, psychologists, psychiatrists, FBI agents, and other mental health professional do not
intrinsically have such expertise.
Along with the substantive control of communication, experts
should also carefully consider how they communicate permissible information to the jury. Monahan and Steadman compare future dangerousness predictions to weather forecasts: “Forecasts possess no intrinsic value . . . [but] acquire value through their ability to influence
the decisions made by users of the forecasts.” 177 Juries must decide
what percentage risk is enough to conclude that there is “a probability” of future dangerousness. Because a mental health professional

175. TEX. DEFENDER SERV., supra note 169, at 30.
176. See Claussen-Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 487-90.
177. Monahan & Steadman, supra note 7, at 937 (quoting Allen H. Murphy, What Is a
Good Forecast? An Essay on the Nature of Goodness in Weather Forecasting, 8 WEATHER &
FORECASTING, 281, 286 (1993)).
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cannot offer advice on how to consider the probability of recidivism in
a normative context, she should be careful about how she presents
evidence to the jury. Adverbs, adjectives, emphasis, and intonation
will pose the greatest threat, as a 62% chance of recidivism sounds
very different when presented as “he has only a 62% chance” versus
“he has a high 62% chance” or even “he has a 62% chance!” These
sorts of simple mistakes can have a large impact on a jury weighing
execution. Only by reducing the expert’s testimony to a recitation of
scientific facts may these mistakes be avoided.
Juries may also be confused if they are presented with all of the
data an actuarial tool returns but provided no further guidance. For
example, while the sophisticated COVR software indicates that an
individual in the highest risk category has a 76% change of recidivism, juries may be inappropriately persuaded by the fact that this is
the highest risk category on the measure. Upon hearing that the defendant has a 76% chance, the jury may be inclined to think that
76% is too low to execute him. But when they learn that 76% is the
highest percentage that the actuarial tool returns, they may feel
compelled to choose death. Thus, juries should be instructed that the
category the defendant falls into is only part of their analysis, not the
end of the future dangerousness consideration.
Indeed, even if studies claim probability levels of 100%, such as
the VRAG’s category 9, 178 that should not be the end of the jury’s
normative contemplation. Juries should still examine the actuarial
instrument used, its applicability to this individual (as compared to
its sample population), and any other mitigating factors. Judges
should instruct juries to consider each of these. To avoid confusion,
juries should only be given information with probative value that exceeds its prejudicial effect. Some evidence, such as that a given percentage is the tests’ highest category, may well be more prejudicial
than probative.
To address jury confusion, judges should be careful to instruct
jury members thoughtfully and to answer questions they pose. It
takes a fair deal of nerve to ask a judge a question, and if a jury does
inquire, it probably indicates that there is something meaningful perplexing them. Judges should respond carefully and thoughtfully.
Judges are a last line of defense to a confused jury –questions they
pose should not be taken lightly or ignored.
One such area of jury confusion is length of sentences. Juries are
often confused in capital considerations and assume that if the defendant is sentenced to life, rather than death, he will be eligible for

178. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 5, app. B at 240, app. C at 245.
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parole. 179 Juries also tend to underestimate the length of a life prison
sentence dramatically. 180 In one study of jurors from actual capital
cases in South Carolina, the median juror prediction was that a life
sentence meant seventeen years in jail. 181 In reality, in the cases the
study involved, the life sentence would have actually meant life in
prison, as the defendants were ineligible for parole. 182 While such
jury mistakes have ramifications for all criminal sentencing involving life imprisonment and the possibility of parole, they have an especially potent impact on future dangerousness considerations.
Judges should consider instructing the jury to avoid such confusion.
In the same vein of fairness to the defendant, courts must allow
defendants faced with future dangerousness evidence to access expert witnesses of their own, even if they cannot afford it. By making
qualified mental health professionals available for consultation, the
court protects the defendant’s rights. The Supreme Court in Barefoot
relied on the adversarial system to sort out the accuracy of expert
witness testimony. 183 But if the defendant is unable to fully utilize
that system, the Court’s rationale fails disastrously.
This principle was recognized in Ake v. Oklahoma, 184 though it
has been somewhat restricted since that decision. 185 The indigent defendant is just as entitled as any other defendant to the protections
the adversarial system affords in future dangerousness cases. To
deny the defendant such protections is to remove one of the fundamental bases on which the Court decided to allow future dangerousness testimony. The loss of these protections would seem to compel the
conclusion that future dangerousness testimony is not permissible in
situations where the defendant cannot fully use the adversarial system. 186
VIII. CONCLUSION
While future dangerousness is permissible in capital sentencing,
179. See Blume et al., supra note 82, at 397-402 (discussing Shafer v. South Carolina,
121 S. Ct. 30 (2000), where the jury was confused about the defendant’s ineligibility for parole and subsequent sentence of death).
180. Id. at 404.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983).
184. 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that due process requires that the defendant have access to mental health evaluation in cases involving future dangerousness determinations).
185. See Dennis, supra note 75, at 298-99 (discussing how decisions since Ake have
narrowed the defendant’s access to counsel). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals now
requires the defendant to show “a reasonable probability that the expert would be of assistance to the defense and that the denial of an expert would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.” Id. at 299 (citing Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc)).
186. For additional discussion on future dangerousness and the adversarial system,
see Regnier, supra note 59, at 379-80.
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several important precautions must be heeded. Evidence must be
presented clearly and restricted to empirical, nonnormative statements. Judges must be diligent gatekeepers and also be sensitive to
jury misunderstandings that may prejudice either party. Daubert
must be applied carefully and accurately. The Supreme Court upheld
the use of future dangerousness largely based on its belief in the reliability of the judicial process to protect individual rights. In capital
sentencing, rights trampled on may not necessarily be revived later.
Death is, after all, irreversible. Future dangerousness use would be increasingly justified if the improvements detailed herein were adopted.
Finally, it is worth remembering that future dangerousness considerations occur squarely at the crossroads of psychology and law.
The result is that literature on the topic comes from psychologists,
lawyers, judges, psychiatrists, law and psychology students, and
countless other professionals. Commentators should always strive for
clarity in making suggestions, and while certain familiarity with the
lexicon may be assumed, explanations via footnote are rarely unwelcome. By doing so, commentators help encourage new entrants who
may have valuable insights to offer into the discussion. Given the severity of the discussion topic, and the consequences of error, the more
thoughtful commentators the better.

